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*Chrono*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-256  
12 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Security Committee

FROM :   
Executive Secretary

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SUBJECT : Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14 (U)

1. (C) As a result of the DCI's review of the Boyce/Lee case, he has directed a number of actions affecting the security of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs and products. Tasking has been given to COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and the Security Committee.

2. (C) The Security Committee has been tasked with re-examining community-wide adherence to DCID 1/14. In order that we may submit the required report to the DCI, you are requested to provide information on the following points:

a. Are the investigative standards set forth in DCID 1/14 being met for individuals under consideration for access to SCI? If not, please provide information on which standards are not being met and for what reasons.

b. Do you consider the minimum standards high enough to ensure comparability of SCI screening among the Intelligence Community agencies? Should they be revised? Comments and justification for the position you take are requested.

c. Are the reinvestigations of personnel provided access to SCI conducted on a five-year recurrent basis as required by the DCID? If not, what reinvestigation cycle are you currently maintaining? General comments on the programs you have instituted to manage this periodic reinvestigation are also requested.

d. In addition to security indoctrination, the DCID requires continuing security programs tailored to create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be left

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unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. Comments on your security education programs and security supervisory programs are requested. Please include the frequency of these programs, the number of participants in a year, and the estimated cycle for participation in such programs.

e. We have been asked to develop an appropriate procedure for the exchange of information to ensure that significant derogatory information used as a basis for denying SCI access by one agency is available to another agency considering granting such access. Your comments on how we might formulate a legal, workable process to effect this exchange is requested.

3. ☐ In order that we might respond in a timely fashion to the DCI, the requested information should be forwarded by 30 July 1977. If there are any questions, please give me a call.

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cc: C/COMIREX  
C/SIGINT Committee

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